Case Screening Summary

Total cases screened: 55 | Passed pre-screen: 44 | Used in final output: 7

Case Name	Citation	Passed Pre-Screen	Reasoning	Used in Final Output
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27	Yes	Section 44(1)-(2): an officer may prepare an inadmissibility report; Minister may refer to Immigration Division for admissibility hearing. Section 63(3): a permanent resident may appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) against a removal order. Section 68(1): IAD may stay a removal order if satisfied that sufficient H&C considerations warrant special relief, taking into account the best interests of any child directly affected. Section 68(4): if the IAD has stayed a removal order and the person is convicted of another s. 36(1) offence, the stay is cancelled by operation of law.	No
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27	Yes	Section 44 authorizes an officer to prepare an inadmissibility report and refer it to the Immigration Division. Section 63(3) gives permanent residents the right to appeal a removal order to the IAD. Section 68(1) allows the IAD to stay removal if sufficient H&C considerations warrant special relief, with the best interests of any child directly affected being a mandatory consideration. Section 68(4) cancels a stay by operation of law if the person is convicted of a further s. 36(1) offence during the stay.	No
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, SC 2008, c 3	An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, SC 2008, c 3	Yes	This is an amending act dealing with security certificates and special advocates — not relevant to the criminality/discharge analysis needed here.	No
R v Kaur,	2026 ABCJ 41	Yes	The decision directly addresses the legal principle of whether a conditional discharge constitutes a "conviction" for the purposes of inadmissibility under IRPA s. 36 and discusses the sentencing judge's discretion to consider collateral immigration consequences when determining a fit sentence.	Yes

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R. v. Cheema	2022 ONCJ 364	Yes	This decision directly addresses the legal principles regarding the immigration consequences of criminal convictions under the IRPA, specifically discussing how a conditional discharge (or lack thereof) impacts a foreign national's inadmissibility for "serious criminality" under s. 36. It also analyzes the role of collateral immigration consequences in sentencing and the limitations of using a discharge to avoid such consequences.	No
Prikishat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2025 FC 94	Yes	The decision explicitly distinguishes between a suspended sentence and a conditional discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code, confirming that a discharge is legally deemed not to be a conviction for the purposes of inadmissibility under IRPA s. 36, whereas a conviction (such as a suspended sentence) triggers inadmissibility.	No
R v Hadni	2022 ABPC 195	Yes	The decision explicitly addresses the legal principles regarding the impact of criminal sentencing on immigration status under the IRPA, specifically discussing the two-step sentencing process established in R v Pham and whether a conditional discharge can be used to avoid immigration inadmissibility.	No
R. v S.(S.)	2021 CanLII 134242 (NL PC)	Yes	This decision is relevant because it explicitly discusses the legal principles surrounding the immigration consequences of criminal convictions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), including the distinction between a conviction and a discharge, and how these consequences are considered by sentencing judges. It directly addresses the interplay between s. 36 of the IRPA and the court's discretion to grant a discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.	No
R. v. Rudder	2018 ONCJ 348	Yes	The decision directly addresses the legal principles of how immigration consequences (specifically inadmissibility under IRPA s. 36) are weighed by a sentencing judge when considering whether to grant a conditional discharge, and clarifies the distinction between "serious criminality" and other convictions.	No
R. v. Charlebois	2011 ABPC 238	Yes	The decision explicitly addresses the legal principles regarding the granting of conditional discharges under section 730(1) of the Criminal Code and discusses the immigration consequences of such dispositions for non-citizens, which is central to the research question.	No
R. v. Lu	2013 ONCA 324	Yes	The decision explicitly addresses the legal principle that a conditional discharge is not considered a "conviction" for the purposes of inadmissibility under IRPA s. 36(2), directly confirming the client's belief regarding the immigration benefit of a discharge. It further discusses the application of R. v. Pham regarding how courts should weigh collateral immigration consequences during sentencing.	Yes

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R v Gebremariam	2024 ABCJ 131	Yes	The decision explicitly addresses the legal principles of inadmissibility under IRPA s. 36 for permanent residents and discusses the impact of sentencing (specifically conditional discharges) on immigration status, citing relevant Supreme Court of Canada and appellate jurisprudence.	No
R v Le	2024 SKKB 175	Yes	This decision directly addresses the legal principle that a conditional discharge under the Criminal Code does not result in inadmissibility under the IRPA, whereas a suspended sentence does. It further confirms that a guilty plea made without knowledge of these specific immigration consequences is considered "uninformed," providing a basis for legal recourse.	No
R. v. Pham	2013 SCC 15	Yes	The Supreme Court of Canada's leading decision on collateral immigration consequences in sentencing. Establishes that a sentencing judge may take collateral immigration consequences into account, provided the sentence remains proportionate to the gravity of the offence and degree of responsibility. Consequences must not dominate the exercise or skew it in favour of or against deportation. An appellate court may intervene where the sentencing judge was unaware of the immigration consequences or counsel failed to advise on them. Court reduced sentence from two years to two years less a day to preserve IAD appeal right.	No
R. v. Wong	2018 SCC 25	Yes	The SCC's leading decision on uninformed guilty pleas arising from unawareness of collateral immigration consequences. The majority (Moldaver, Gascon, Brown, Rowe JJ.) held at para 4 that for a plea to be informed, the accused must be aware of legally relevant collateral consequences, including immigration consequences. A legally relevant collateral consequence is one that bears on sufficiently serious legal interests. At para 6, the majority established the subjective prejudice test: the accused must file an affidavit establishing a reasonable possibility they would have (1) pleaded not guilty, or (2) pleaded guilty with different conditions. The dissent (Wagner J.) preferred a modified objective standard but agreed on all other principles. Both majority and dissent agreed at paras 4, 44, and 102 that immigration consequences (loss of PR status, removal without right of appeal) constitute legally relevant collateral consequences. Highly relevant to client's situation where previous counsel did not advise of immigration consequences.	Yes

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Cha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.A.)	2006 FCA 126	Yes	Federal Court of Appeal's leading decision on the scope of ministerial discretion under IRPA s. 44(2). Critically confirms at para 35 that immigration officers and Minister's delegates have NO discretion to consider mitigating personal circumstances when making inadmissibility findings for criminality in Canada — they are on a "fact-finding mission, no more, no less." At para 13, court expressly notes the decision applies to foreign nationals, not permanent residents (who are referred to the Immigration Division). Confirms at para 40 that H&C relief under s. 25 and pre-removal risk assessment under s. 112 remain available avenues even after a removal order is issued. Importantly, s. 36(3)(b) as reproduced at para 15 uses the word "pardon" — not discharge — as the exemption, confirming a conditional discharge is NOT listed as exempting a person from inadmissibility under s. 36. However, the discharge avoids the "conviction" trigger entirely, making s. 36 inapplicable from the outset.	Yes
Iamkhong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2011 FC 355	Yes	The decision explicitly discusses the application of the Ribic factors by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) when determining whether to grant special relief (a stay of removal) to a permanent resident found inadmissible due to serious criminality. It provides a detailed analysis of how the IAD weighs these factors, including rehabilitation, hardship, and family/community support, in the context of an appeal under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.	Yes
Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)	2006 FC 979	Yes	The decision explicitly identifies and applies the "Ribic factors" used by the Immigration Appeal Division to determine whether to grant a stay of a removal order for a permanent resident, which is the core legal principle requested in the screening context.	No
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bryan	2006 FC 146	Yes	The decision explicitly identifies and lists the "Ribic factors" used by the Immigration Appeal Division to assess whether to grant a stay of a removal order, which is the specific legal test requested by the researcher.	Yes
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Mendoza Reyes	2009 FC 1097	Yes	This decision is relevant because it explicitly identifies and lists the "Ribic factors" used by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) to assess humanitarian and compassionate grounds when deciding whether to stay a removal order for a permanent resident convicted of a criminal offence. The court further discusses the requirement for the IAD to transparently apply these factors in its decision-making process.	No
Abdallah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2010 FC 6	Yes	This decision is relevant because it explicitly discusses the Immigration Appeal Division's (IAD) application of the Ribic factors when reconsidering a stay of a removal order for a permanent resident, which is the core legal test the researcher is investigating.	No

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Gao v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2019 FC 939	Yes	The decision explicitly lists and applies the "Ribic factors" used by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) to determine whether to grant humanitarian and compassionate relief to a permanent resident facing a removal order, which is the core legal test requested by the researcher.	No
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Stephenson (F.C.)	2008 FC 82	Yes	This decision explicitly confirms that the IAD is required to apply the Ribic factors when reconsidering a stay of removal under section 68(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which is the exact legal test the researcher is seeking.	No
Monge Monge v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)	2009 FC 809	Yes	This decision is relevant because it discusses the scope of discretion under section 44 of the IRPA regarding the referral of inadmissibility reports and explicitly addresses the application of the Ribic factors by the Minister's delegate when balancing humanitarian and compassionate grounds against criminal history.	No
Li v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2009 FC 992	Yes	This decision is highly relevant as it explicitly discusses the application of the Ribic factors by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) when determining whether to grant special relief from a removal order. It further clarifies the scope of the IAD's humanitarian and compassionate discretion, specifically addressing the distinction between the IAD's mandate and criminal sentencing principles.	Yes
Zhang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2020 FC 927	Yes	This decision is highly relevant as it provides a detailed judicial analysis of the application of the Ribic factors within the context of the Immigration Appeal Division’s (IAD) decision-making process under sections 67(1)(c) and 68(1) of the IRPA. It specifically addresses the legal principles and methodology the IAD must use when weighing humanitarian and compassionate considerations against public safety and the risk of reoffending when deciding whether to allow an appeal or grant a stay of a removal order.	No
Act to promote good citizenship, CQLR c C-20	Act to promote good citizenship, CQLR c C-20	Yes	Quebec provincial legislation — not the federal Citizenship Act. Not relevant to this analysis.	No

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Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29	Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29	Yes	Section 5(1)(c) requires 1,095 days of physical presence in the five years immediately before the application date. Section 5(1)(f) bars citizenship to anyone who "is not under a removal order" — meaning a person under a removal order cannot obtain citizenship. This is critical: if client faces a removal order, she cannot apply for citizenship until it is resolved. Section 5(1)(c) also requires permanent resident status with no unfulfilled conditions. Client has been a PR for six years — she meets the physical presence requirement on its face. The key obstacle is s. 5(1)(f) if a removal order is issued, and s. 22(2) if she were found to have a "conviction" — but as her conditional discharge deems her not convicted under s. 730(3) Criminal Code, s. 22(2) should not apply. The s. 22(1)(a)(i) probation bar has now expired as she has completed her probation conditions.	No
Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5	Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5	Yes	Section 22(2) bars citizenship to anyone "convicted of an indictable offence under any Act of Parliament" during the four-year period before the application, "subject to the Criminal Records Act." Since theft under $5,000 is a hybrid offence deemed indictable under IRPA s. 36(3)(a), s. 22(2) would ordinarily apply. HOWEVER, s. 22(2) is expressly predicated on "conviction" — and a conditional discharge under s. 730(3) of the Criminal Code deems the offender "not to have been convicted." Therefore, s. 22(2) should NOT bar client's citizenship application. Section 22(1)(a)(i) temporarily bars citizenship while under probation order — this bar has now expired as client completed her probation. Section 21 means the probation period cannot be counted as physical presence. Section 5(1)(f) bars citizenship if the person is under a removal order — this is the critical ongoing risk if inadmissibility proceedings are commenced.	No
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46	Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46	Yes	Section 730(1) authorizes a court to discharge an accused absolutely or conditionally where the offence has no minimum punishment and is not punishable by 14 years or life. Section 730(3) is the operative provision: "the offender shall be deemed not to have been convicted of the offence." This is the statutory basis for the position that a conditional discharge avoids the "conviction" trigger in IRPA s. 36 and Citizenship Act s. 22(2). Section 730(4) provides that if the offender breaches probation conditions and is convicted of another offence, the court may revoke the discharge and enter a conviction — highly relevant as client has successfully completed her probation, meaning the discharge is now absolute in effect and cannot be revoked.	No
R. v. Kulatheeswaran	(no citation)	No	This decision concerns the sentencing of a Canadian citizen for firearm offences and does not address immigration law, the consequences of a conditional discharge for permanent residents, or the specific inadmissibility risks faced by the client. While it discusses sentencing principles, it provides no guidance on the immigration-related research questions posed.	N/A

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R. v. Farac	(no citation)	Yes	This decision provides a detailed analysis of how sentencing judges must balance the "fundamental principle" of proportionality against the collateral immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, specifically citing R. v. Pham and Tran v. Canada. It directly addresses the legal limits on "creative sentencing" intended to avoid deportation, which is central to your client's concerns regarding her conditional discharge and future immigration status.	No
Adebowale Adekoya v. His Majesty the King	(no citation)	Yes	This decision provides a significant application of R. v. Pham regarding the consideration of collateral immigration consequences in sentencing. It specifically addresses the court's authority to grant a conditional discharge to mitigate disproportionate immigration outcomes, which is directly applicable to your client's situation regarding her theft conviction and immigration status.	No
R. v. Acosta	(no citation)	Yes	The decision provides a clear, practical application of how sentencing (specifically the distinction between a term of imprisonment and a conditional sentence) directly impacts a permanent resident's ability to appeal a removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. It substantively engages with the interplay between criminal sentencing and immigration consequences, which is central to the client's concerns regarding her status.	No
R. v. A.S.	(no citation)	Yes	Empty Gemini response	No
R. v. Wesley	(no citation)	No	This decision is a sentencing judgment for a violent criminal offence (robbery and aggravated assault) involving an Indigenous offender and does not address immigration law, permanent residency, or the specific consequences of a conditional discharge for non-citizens. It provides no guidance on the research question regarding the client's inadmissibility risk or citizenship eligibility.	N/A
R. v. Farac	2026 BCCA 64	Yes	Very recent BCCA decision (February 2026) applying Pham to a permanent resident sentenced for firearms offences. At paras 23-24, court confirms: s. 36(1)(a) IRPA renders a PR inadmissible for conviction of an offence punishable by maximum of at least 10 years; s. 64 bars IAD appeal for sentences of 6+ months imprisonment; a conditional sentence is NOT a "term of imprisonment" for s. 64 IRPA purposes (citing Tran 2017 SCC 50 at para 24). At paras 27-30, court clarifies that collateral immigration consequences go to individualization and parity, NOT proportionality — they do not reduce moral culpability or the gravity of the offence. At para 37, quotes Pham para 18: the further the varied sentence is from the appropriate range, the less likely it remains proportionate. Court upheld sentence of 774 days despite loss of IAD appeal rights. Key principle for our client: a conditional discharge avoids the "conviction" trigger entirely, so the s. 36(1)(a) inadmissibility issue never arises in her case.	No

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Adebowale Adekoya v. His Majesty the King	2026 NBKB 69	Yes	Very recent NB King's Bench decision (March 2026) on appeal from provincial court, varying sentence from 12-month probation to conditional discharge specifically to avoid deportation consequences. Court applies R v Pham 2013 SCC 15 and grants conditional discharge for breach of no-contact order where trial judge failed to consider immigration consequences (misinformed by defence counsel that accused was a Canadian/US dual citizen). At para 60, court states that a conviction "would result in a disproportionate sentence" given the nature of the offence. At para 61, court found conditional discharge in best interests and not contrary to public interest. Directly relevant to client's situation — confirms courts will grant conditional discharge on appeal where immigration consequences were not properly considered at sentencing, and that first-time offenders who have complied with probation conditions are strong candidates for discharge. Also confirms at para 27 (quoting Elsharawy) the two-part test for discharge: (1) best interests of accused; (2) not contrary to public interest.	No
R. v. Acosta	2026 ONSC 1618	Yes	Very recent Ontario Superior Court sentencing decision (March 2026) involving a permanent resident from the Philippines convicted of drug trafficking. At para 19, court confirms: (1) conviction of indictable offence punishable by 10+ years triggers s. 36(1)(a) IRPA inadmissibility; (2) a conditional sentence is NOT a "term of imprisonment" for s. 64(2) IRPA purposes (citing Tran 2017 SCC 50 at para 24), so a conditional sentence preserves the IAD appeal right; (3) a term of imprisonment of 6+ months bars IAD appeal. At para 34, court expressly states it is NOT granting a conditional sentence to avoid immigration consequences — a conditional sentence must be independently fit on sentencing principles per Pham. Court imposed 21-month conditional sentence. Directly analogous to client's situation as a permanent resident from the Philippines, single offence, no prior record, financial hardship as context.	No
R. v. A.S.	2026 ONCJ 137	Yes	Sexual interference sentencing decision for a 72-year-old accused — factually unrelated to the client's situation. References Pham 2013 SCC 15 at para 65 for the proposition that collateral consequences (family separation) cannot produce a disproportionate sentence. Not relevant to the conditional discharge/inadmissibility analysis.	No
R. v. Di Paola	(no citation)	Yes	This decision provides a definitive interpretation of s. 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which is the primary mechanism for a sentencing judge to consider uncharged conduct as an aggravating factor. It is highly significant for your client because it clarifies that the Crown can rely on facts from previously laid (but withdrawn) charges to increase a sentence, provided the Crown acts with fairness and transparency.	No

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R. v. Hummer	(no citation)	No	This decision concerns the criteria for setting aside a guilty plea based on mental health and does not address immigration inadmissibility, the effect of a conditional discharge on immigration status, or citizenship eligibility. It cites R. v. Wong and R. v. Cherrington only in the context of the requirements for a valid plea, not in relation to the immigration consequences relevant to your client.	N/A
R v Munro	(no citation)	No	While the decision cites R v Wong regarding the withdrawal of guilty pleas, it does so in the context of a criminal appeal involving child pornography charges and does not address the immigration consequences or the specific "conditional discharge" issues relevant to your client's permanent residence status.	N/A
R v Y.B.R.	(no citation)	No	While the decision discusses the duty of counsel to inform an accused of immigration consequences, it concerns a serious criminal conviction (sexual assault) and does not address the specific legal nuances of conditional discharges under the Criminal Code or their impact on immigration status for permanent residents. The case focuses on the threshold for setting aside a guilty plea due to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel rather than the immigration-related research questions posed by the client.	N/A
Rebelo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	(no citation)	Yes	This decision provides a critical analysis of the jurisdictional bar under s. 64 of the IRPA regarding whether a successful criminal appeal (reducing a sentence to under six months) restores a permanent resident's right to appeal a removal order to the IAD. It directly addresses the conflict between the Nabiloo and Asphall precedents, which is central to determining whether your client's conditional discharge—if it results in a sentence of less than six months—can effectively lift the statutory bar to her IAD appeal.	No
R v Kahlon	(no citation)	No	This decision concerns an application to set aside a guilty plea in a criminal drug trafficking case and does not address the immigration consequences of a conditional discharge or the specific inadmissibility risks relevant to your client's situation. It focuses exclusively on the procedural requirements for a valid guilty plea under the Criminal Code and does not provide guidance on the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.	N/A
R. v Dennis	(no citation)	No	This decision concerns an application to withdraw a guilty plea in a murder case based on a misunderstanding of parole ineligibility, which is legally and factually distinct from the immigration inadmissibility issues faced by your client. While it cites R. v. Wong regarding the requirements for an informed plea, it does not provide substantive analysis or guidance on the immigration consequences of a conditional discharge or the specific inadmissibility risks relevant to your client's situation.	N/A

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R. v. Pusey	(no citation)	Yes	The decision provides a detailed analysis of the legal standard for an "informed" guilty plea in the context of immigration consequences, specifically confirming that an accused need only be aware of the possibility of serious immigration jeopardy (such as deportation) for a plea to be valid. This directly addresses your client's concern regarding whether her previous lawyer's failure to provide specific immigration advice or the misunderstanding of the conditional discharge's effect constitutes grounds to challenge her conviction.	No
R. v. Di Paola	2025 CanLII 10448 (SCC)	Yes	SCC decision on s. 725(1)(c) Criminal Code — whether aggravating facts underlying a withdrawn charge can be considered at sentencing. Not directly relevant to the conditional discharge/IRPA inadmissibility analysis. The decision confirms at para 53 that Wong 2018 SCC 25 remains good law on uninformed guilty pleas. Not useful for the memo.	No
Rebelo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	2025 FC 1738	Yes	Highly important 2025 Federal Court decision on the intersection of IRPA s. 64(2) and successful criminal appeals. Court sets aside IAD decision dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Court found the Nabiloo interpretation (s. 64 bar can lift when sentence is subsequently reduced below 6 months) more persuasive than Asphall. Certified question to FCA on whether IAD is permanently deprived of jurisdiction under ss. 64(1)-(2) once a sentence exceeded 6 months at time of inadmissibility determination. Critical point for client's memo: this case is about an entirely different situation — client received a conditional discharge, so no conviction was entered, IRPA s. 36 is not triggered at all, and ss. 63-64 only become relevant if a removal order is actually issued. The Rebelo/Nabiloo/Asphall conflict does not affect client's position. However, Rebelo confirms at paras 3, 14-15 the operative text of ss. 64(1)-(2), and at para 83 confirms that H&C under s. 25 is an "override" or "safety valve" that does not substitute for IAD appeal rights.	No

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R. v. Pusey	2026 ONSC 340	Yes	Very recent Ontario Superior Court decision dismissing application to strike guilty plea on grounds of uninformed immigration consequences. Applies R v Wong 2018 SCC 25. At paras 34-35, court adopts the principle from R v Singh, 2025 ONSC 5997 and R v Johnson, 2024 SKCA 58 that it is sufficient for a plea to be informed if the accused knew of the "possibility" that the conviction would place immigration status in "serious jeopardy" — the accused need not know the specific details or appellate rights within the immigration process. Critical distinction from client's situation: in Pusey, the accused was warned multiple times about immigration consequences, signed written instructions acknowledging them, was offered the opportunity to consult an immigration lawyer, and declined. Client's situation is different — previous counsel did not advise her at all that the conditional discharge would not protect her from IRPA consequences if the discharge were ever revoked, and more importantly did not advise her about the interaction between s. 21 Citizenship Act and the probation order. The discharge here was correctly granted and IS protecting her, so Wong's uninformed plea analysis may be less directly applicable.	No
Rezaie v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)	(no citation)	No	This decision focuses on the reasonableness of an Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) decision regarding humanitarian and compassionate relief for a permanent resident with serious drug trafficking convictions. It does not address the specific legal issues raised in your research, such as the immigration consequences of a conditional discharge for theft under $5,000 or the eligibility requirements for citizenship.	N/A
Meghjani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	(no citation)	No	This decision concerns residency obligations for permanent residents under section 28 of the IRPA and the scope of humanitarian and compassionate relief in that specific context. It does not address the legal consequences of a conditional discharge for a criminal conviction or the resulting inadmissibility risks relevant to your client's situation.	N/A
Kanguatjivi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)	(no citation)	No	This decision focuses on the judicial review of a humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) application and the evidentiary burden on an applicant to prove hardship; it does not address the specific legal consequences of a conditional discharge for criminal inadmissibility or the eligibility requirements for Canadian citizenship.	N/A
Ibrahim v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)	(no citation)	No	This decision concerns a judicial review of a misrepresentation finding and the assessment of humanitarian and compassionate grounds; it does not address the specific legal issues regarding conditional discharges, criminal inadmissibility for theft, or citizenship eligibility relevant to your client's situation.	N/A